The paper deals with an infinite horizon dynamic duopoly composed of price setting firms, producing differentiated products, with sales constrained by capacities that are increased or maintained by investments. We analyze continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibria, in which strategies are continuous functions of (only) current capacities. The weakest possible criterion of a renegotiation-proofness, called renegotiation-quasi-proofness, eliminates all equilibria in which some continuation equilibrium path in the capacity space does not converge to a Pareto efficient capacity vector giving both firms no lower single period net profit than some (but the same for both firms) capacity unconstrained Bertrand equilibrium.
INTRODUCTION
Many infinite horizon, discrete time, deterministic oligopoly models involve physical links between periods, i.e., they are oligopolistic difference games. These links can stem, for example, from investment or advertising. In difference games, a current state, which is payoff relevant, should be taken into account by rational players when deciding on a current period action. If strategies depend only on a current payoff relevant state and not on which history led to it, they are called Markov. Application of the requirement of subgame perfection to Markov strategies forming a Nash equilibrium leads to the solution concept of a Markov perfect equilibrium. In many oligopolistic infinite horizon difference games (the unique) Markov perfect equilibrium is non-collusive. (See [6] for a typical example. Maskin and Tirole's model of a dynamic Bertrand duopoly [7] is a notable exception.)
In the present paper we analyze Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite horizon, discrete time, dynamic duopoly, composed of price setting firms, discounting future profits, producing differentiated products, with sales constrained by capacities. In order to maintain next period capacities on their current level or to increase them, current period investments are needed. Thus, current capacities are payoff relevant state variables. We impose an additional requirement on firms' strategies: they should be continuous in their arguments. In a Markov setting it means that each firm's current period investment into capacity and price charged is a continuous function of a current period capacity vector. Nevertheless, an equilibrium strategy profile has to be immune against every possible unilateral deviation to any closed loop strategy.
The requirement of continuity of strategies was introduced into the analysis of infinite horizon games with discounting of payoffs by J. W. Friedman and L. Samuelson ( [2] , [3] ).
It is based on the view that punishments should "fit the crime." Two main arguments in favour of continuous strategies are [3] : they are more appealing to real human players than a Draconian punishment after a very small deviation; following a deviation, the convergence of continuous strategies to the original action profile (or, in a Markov setting, to the limit of the original sequence of action profiles) reflects an intuitively appealing rebuilding of trust.
We think that in the case of oligopolistic infinite horizon games there is an additional, policy related, argument: since collusive behaviour can be viewed as a violation of antitrust laws, continuous strategies reduce the risk of attracting attention of an agency responsible for protection of competition.
Continuous Markov strategies have the plausible property that large changes in payoff relevant variables have large effects on current actions, minor changes in payoff relevant variables have minor effects on current actions, and changes in variables that are not payoff relevant have no effect on current actions. This is an improvement in comparison with Markov strategies without the requirement of continuity for which there is only the distinction between effect and no effect according to whether a variable that has changed is payoff relevant or not, so that minor changes in payoff relevant variables can have large effects on current actions. (See the discussion of minor causes and minor effects in [8] ). It is an improvement also in comparison with continuous strategies without the Markov property, which allow changes in variables that are not payoff relevant to effect current actions.
The requirement that strategies be Markov is an application of Harsanyi's and Selten's [4] principle of invariance of (selected) equilibrium strategies with respect to isomorphism of games. (This fact is pointed out by Maskin and Tirole [8] .) The latter principle requires that strategically equivalent games have identical solution (i.e., selected 4 equilibrium or subset of equilibria). Applying it to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the analyzed difference game, it implies that any element of selected subset of equilibrium strategy profiles should prescribe the same play in all subgames that are strategically equivalent, i.e., in all subgames with the same initial state. The requirement of continuity of strategies is a strengthening of this principle. When two subgames are, from the strategic point of view, "close", i.e., an initial state of one of them is in a neighbourhood of an initial state of the other, a sequence of vectors of actions prescribed for the former should be in a neighbourhood (on the element-wise basis) of a sequence of vectors of actions prescribed for the latter. (More precisely: Consider two subgames with initial states, i.e. capacity vectors, y ∈ Y and y' ∈ Y. Let the sequences of actions profiles that an equilibrium strategy profile prescribes in them if neither firm deviates be {(ρ 1
, where, for each positive integer k,
Restriction of attention to Markov perfect equilibria imposes three limitations on equilibrium strategies. First, counting of repetitions of a certain action vector is impossible.
Therefore, after a profitable deviation (i.e., a deviation that, if the other firm ignored it, would increase a deviator's continuation average discounted net profit) the play has to pass (in general) through different action vectors lying on a punishment path before reaching a collusive action profile. Second, an action vector prescribed (by an equilibrium strategy profile) for the first period must be the same as an action vector prescribed when the initial state reappears after a deviation. Thus, even at the beginning of the game a collusive action vector can be only gradually approached (unless the initial state cannot result from a profitable unilateral deviation from any continuation equilibrium and does not lie on a 5 punishment path). Third, the punishment path must be the same for both firms. Otherwise, if there were two different punishment paths, after some (unilateral) deviations from them it would be impossible to determine, only on the basis of a current capacity vector, from which of them a deviation took place. Adding the requirement of continuity of strategies leads to the fourth limitation. After a deviation as well as at the beginning of the game, the play can (in general) only converge to a collusive action vector, without reaching it in any finite time.
In equilibrium firms charge prices given by a capacity constrained Bertrand equilibrium. The reason for this is that a deviation in a price (when a capacity vector is consistent with the play prescribed by an equilibrium strategy profile) cannot be punished, because strategies depend only on capacities. Therefore, what matters most in any subgame, is an initial capacity vector and a sequence of investments by both firms, determining a sequence of capacity vectors, i.e., a "reduced Cournot form" of a subgame. This is a typical feature of models of oligopoly with capacity constrained price setters, first pointed out (in the framework of two-stage homogeneous good duopoly model) by Kreps and Scheinkman [5] .
For discount factors close to one, the analyzed dynamic duopoly game has a multiplicity (indeed, a continuum) of continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibria. The reason for this is that, unlike in Maskin and Tirole's [6] model of a dynamic Cournot duopoly, in every period there is a (nontrivial) payoff relevant state variable for each firm.
This makes detection of a unilateral deviation possible (although identification of a deviator and an action vector from which a deviation took place is not possible).
Multiplicity of equilibria raises the issue of reduction of the set of them. We approach the latter on the basis of the weakest possible concept of a renegotiation-proofness, cycle is a switching to a collusive strategy profile prescribing, after a finite number of periods, an infinite repetition of a certain price vector.) In our case a renegotiation is based on a change of the capacity and the price vector to which the play in every subgame converges.
The set of strategy profiles to which firms are allowed to renegotiate is restricted here.
We confine attention to renegotiation to other continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibria.
This is natural. Since we assume (for reasons explained above) that firms will coordinate on an equilibrium of this type, there is no reason to assume that they will renegotiate to another equilibrium that is not of this type. Application of the criterion of renegotiation- continuation equilibrium paths (in the capacity space) converge to y * . Thus, we obtain a characterization of the set of equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we formally describe the analyzed dynamic duopoly. In Section 3 we prove necessary conditions of the existence of a renegotiation-quasi-proof continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of the analyzed duopolistic game. In Section 4 we prove sufficient conditions of its existence. Section 5 concludes.
THE DYNAMIC DUOPOLY
In this section we specify assumptions on the analyzed duopolistic industry and give definitions of game theoretic solution concepts that we use. .) The (minimum) investment expenditures needed to achieve capacity y i (t+1) when the current capacity is y i (t) are α i (y i (t), y i (t+1)), where
] is firm i's investment function (γ i is defined below). We set α −1 (y(t), (k 1 (t), k 2 (t))) = (α 1 −1
(y 1 (t), k 1 (t)), α 2 −1 (y 2 (t), k 2 (t))).
Assumption 5. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, there is δ i ∈ (0, 1) such that
i.e., δ i is a depreciation rate. vector in period t is (p i (t), k i (t)) and its action space is P i x K i . We set P = P 1 x P 2 and p(t) = (p 1 (t), p 2 (t)). Firm i discounts future revenues and costs by discount factor β i ∈ (0, 1) and we let β = (β 1 , β 2 ). (q) > 0 (with left or right hand side derivatives at boundaries of Q).
and
Assumption 12. Binding agreements between the firms are not possible.
The conditions (2a)-(2b) ensure that no firm can eliminate the other firm from the market. In other words, each firm, if it was originally a monopolist, would have to accommodate an entry of the other. Therefore, no firm can avoid an infinite horizon strategic interaction with the other.
Firm i's gross (of investment expenditures) profit in period t is
and its net profit in period t is
In the following text we refer to this dynamic duopoly as "G DD " or "the game G DD ."
Assumption 13. For each firm, average discounted net profit is its payoff function in Average discounted net profit of firm i in a subgame with an initial state y, when firms follow a Markov strategy profile s, is
where y(1) = y and y i (t+1) = α i −1
[y i (t), η i (y(t))] for each i ∈ {1, 2} and every positive integer t. (Without loss of generality, we can number the first period of a subgame by one.) We set
A Markov perfect equilibrium of G DD is a profile of Markov strategies that yields a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of G DD . The following definition expresses this formally.
DEFINITION 1. A profile of Markov strategies s ∈ S is a Markov perfect equilibrium
of G DD if, for every state y ∈ Y, for each firm i ∈ {1, 2}, for j ∈ {1, 2}\{i}, and for every
If one of the firms uses Markov strategy then there is a best response of the other firm against it (chosen from the whole set of its closed loop strategies) that is also a Markov strategy. Therefore, a Markov perfect equilibrium is still a subgame perfect equilibrium when the Markov restriction is not imposed. 
Firm i's Markov strategy s i is continuous if it is a continuous function from Y to
Note that here we (have to) require explicitly that a continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium is immune to all unilateral deviations to a Markov strategy that is not continuous.
We conclude this section by the definition of the concept of a renegotiation-quasiproof continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium. That is, s 0 ∈ S * is renegotiation-quasi-proof if there is no continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium s ∈ S * such that, by jointly switching from s 0 to s, both firms increase their average discounted net profit in every subgame of G DD . As it is usual in the literature on renegotiation-proofness (e.g. [1] , [7] ), the set of strategy profiles to which firms are allowed to renegotiate is restricted here. Since we assume (for reasons explained in the Introduction) that firms will coordinate on a continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium, there is no reason to assume that they will renegotiate to an equilibrium that is not of this type. The use of weak rather than strict Pareto efficiency in Definition 3 is also in line with the bulk of the literature on renegotiation-proofness. (Nevertheless, our results would still hold if we used strict Pareto efficiency.)
The concept of a renegotiation-quasi-proofness used here is the weakest possible notion of a renegotiation-proofness. A renegotiation increasing average discounted net profit of both firms in every subgame is the most tempting of all imaginable renegotiation opportunities. If it is possible then we can hardly expect that firms will stick to the original equilibrium. Nevertheless, this weak concept is strong enough to ensure that all continuation equilibrium paths (in the capacity space) converge to a Pareto efficient capacity vector.
Moreover, the use of a stronger concept of renegotiation-proofness would not strengthen our results.
Since the concept of a renegotiation-proofness that we use is so weak we do not find it appropriate to call it simply "renegotiation-proofness." Nor we can use the term "weak renegotiation-proofness" because the latter was already coined by Farrell and Maskin [1] for a different concept. Therefore we use (somewhat unwieldy) term "renegotiation-quasiproofness."
For discount factors close to one the concept of a renegotiation-quasi-proofness is similar to the concept of renegotiation-proofness in Maskin's and Tirole's [7] paper on dynamic Bertrand duopoly. In their model a renegotiation is based on a change of the price vector that is, after a finite number of periods, infinitely repeated in every subgame. (A renegotiation away from an Edgeworth cycle is a switching to a collusive strategy profile prescribing, after a finite number of periods, an infinite repetition of a certain price vector.)
In our case a renegotiation is based on a change of the capacity and price vectors to which the play in every subgame converges. vector. We specify also other requirements that a limit of all continuation equilibrium paths (in the capacity space) of a renegotiation-quasi-proof continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium must satisfy.
As already noted in the Introduction, at each state prices charged form a capacity constrained Bertrand equilibrium. Therefore we first define the latter concept and give (in 
and For firm k, when β k approaches one, its average discounted net profit from a permanent (upward or downward) deviation in capacity at the state y 0 (starting at the state y 0 ) could approach a number no lower than max{π k (ρ(y 0 ),
Proof. (a) Let
Thus, (8) and (9) at which a limit of f does not exist nor points at which a limit of f differs from a value of f.
Also, f is defined at each point of O(y 1 * ). Thus, f is a continuous function. The last claim of this part of the proposition is obvious. Otherwise, small unilateral upward deviations in capacity at the state y * could not be punished.
SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In this section we give sufficient conditions of the existence of a renegotiation-quasi-proof continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of G DD . We characterize the set of limits of all continuation equilibrium paths of all such equilibria. We show that, under one additional assumption, Pareto efficiency and conditions analogous to (8) , but expressed in terms of gross rather than net profits, are sufficient for a capacity vector to be a limit of all continuation equilibrium paths in the capacity space of some renegotiation-quasi-proof continuous strategy Markov perfect equilibrium of G DD . ((y j , ω(y j ))) (7a) is satisfied as equality for firm i. This can be seen as follows. . Thus, at D −1 ((y j , y i )) (7a) must be satisfied as equality for firm i. We set ω j (y j ) = y i . Assumption 8 implies that when y j is decreasing, ω j (y j ) must be increasing.
Uniqueness of a capacity constrained Bertrand equilibrium at (y j , ω j (y j )) follows from part ( 
The investment expenditures part of s * is given by
We set the parameter r close enough to one to ensure that 
where capacity vector y 0 , index j, and the function ω j are defined as in the "Preliminaries" 31 part of the proof of Proposition 2.
CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed a dynamic duopoly in which simultaneously moving firms choose in each period investment expenditures, affecting next period capacities, and prices charged.
(The results can be applied to other dynamic games in economics or political science where players simultaneously choose actions affecting future state variables and other actions whose consequences are constrained by state variables.) A reduction of the set of equilibria was based on imposing three requirements on subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. First, we required them to be Markov. Second, we required that equilibrium strategies be continuous (functions of their arguments). Third, we required them to be renegotiation-quasi-proof.
This still leaves a continuum of equilibria, even a continuum of limits of continuation equilibrium paths. Nevertheless, the set of equilibria (and especially of limits of continuation equilibrium paths) is restricted by the lower bound on continuation equilibrium average discounted net profits derived from single period net profits at the capacity unconstrained static Bertrand equilibrium of the analyzed duopoly.
We have derived (in part (c) of Proposition 1) a necessary condition that a function describing continuation equilibrium paths must satisfy in a neighbourhood of their limit.
Thus, although we did not identify the unique limit of all continuation equilibrium paths of all (renegotiation-quasi-proof continuous strategy Markov perfect) equilibria, evaluation of them (and, possibly, choice between them) can be based on judgement on how reasonable continuation equilibrium paths, and equilibrium strategies generating them, are. (See also the discussion of strategies versus payoffs in [10] .) For example, if y 1 * = y 2 * = 5, then the linear punishment path y 2 = 5y 1 -20 (implying that a deviation by firm one to capacity 6 would increase difference y 2 -y 1 to slightly more than 4, whereas a deviation by firm two to capacity 6 would increase it only to slightly more than 0.8) does not seem to be plausible.
(Under the assumptions made in this paper, for each Pareto efficient capacity vector satisfying (11) there is exactly one linear punishment path.)
We have made the assumption of constant marginal costs of production only for the sake of simplicity of exposition. All qualitative results continue to hold also for strictly convex production costs functions, but a capacity constrained vector demand function Z(p, y) must be redefined, taking into account that, at a given price, a firm will not produce and sell more than an amount equal to its competitive supply.
